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I. History’s intelligibility – learning from some paradoxes
The fundamental philosophical concepts are historical concepts.  This does not mean only that each Philosophy receives its problems and con-




RESUMEN: Siguiendo los enfoques contem-
poráneos del significado de la Historia de la 
Filosofía para la Filosofía, en este trabajo abor-
daré la situación de la Historia de la Filosofía 
de Hegel en el sistema, confrontándola con las 
Historias especiales (Política, Arte, Religión), 
el desarrollo lógico de la Idea en figuras y las 
«totalidades concretas» dotadas de significa-
do epocal. El texto es también un ensayo de 
articulación del desarrollo lógico de la Idea 
con las condiciones semánticas de las réplicas 
históricas de su significado. 
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ABSTRACT: Following contemporary 
approaches to the meaning of the History 
of Philosophy to Philosophy, in this paper 
I’ll address the situation of Hegel’s History 
of Philosophy in the system, confronting 
it with the special Histories (Politics, Art, 
Religion), the logical development of the 
Idea in figures and the epochal meaningful 
“concrete totalities”. The paper is also a first 
essay to articulate the logical development 
of the Idea with the semantical conditions 
of the historical rendering of its meaning.
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semantic indebtedness towards a thinking tradition and towards more general 
semantic associations.       
History of Philosophy is in a twofold manner attached to History and in 
a twofold mode attached to Philosophy. 
Regarding History, History of Philosophy situates Philosophy or the phi-
losophers as heirs of their own social and political time and as legatees of a 
philosophical tradition. Considering Philosophy itself, History of Philosophy 
is an object for philosophical explanation and what is rebuilt whenever a phi-
losopher conceives the past of Philosophy for its own purposes.
From this last point of view, the past of Philosophy is an idealized metaphor 
for the thinking activity of the philosopher and not a true historical object.
Under the concept of Historicity, the generation of philosophers that 
includes Mariano Álvarez-Goméz has conveyed a philosophical method to 
address some frequent topics of philosophical analysis of History of Philosophy. 
These go from the temporality of the human being situated in the world 
(following Martin Heidegger’s Daseinsanalyse, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s views 
on the Historicity of meaning understanding or Paul Ricoeur’s use of the di-
alogue-world-text structure of historical understanding); the hermeneutical 
transformation of the methods of the Geisteswissenschaften and History (along 
the path opened by Wilhelm Dilthey’s and Paul Yorck’s essays); the engagement 
in so-called historical demythologization and in clarification of the existential 
Christian biblical message for the contemporary world (mainly after Rudolf 
Bultmann); and the topics related to memory and narrative-agential structures 
in textual analysis (P. Ricoeur).
Essential traits of this universal method, going from History to Practical 
Philosophy and to the Methods of textual Hermeneutics, were exposed and re-
shaped in the field of the «History of Concepts», particularly through Reinhart 
Koselleck’s detailed historical research guided by the faith in a reflective path-
way going from Social History, History of Concepts to History of Philosophy.
The today’s undisputable outcome of this large movement of ideas is the 
thesis of the synthesis of the subjective and objective aspects of the traditional 
meaning of History as narrative understanding and res gestae – conceptual 
semantics is neither subjective nor objective.  
M. Álvarez-Gómez investigations on Nicholas of Cusa and Hegel are 
illustrations of the application to the particular field of essential texts of the 
modern History of Philosophy of a shared methodological approach to History 
of Philosophy of an entire generation of academics.  
More recent epistemological trends of the 1980s and 1990s, some of them 
connected to Deconstruction (J. Derrida), to the manifold constructivist 
movement, the continuous reception of philosophical views different form the 
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hermeneutical tradition (v. g. Michel Foucault) or the varieties of «discourse 
analysis» with distinct semiotic proposals went into directions and analytical 
demands difficult to predict some decades before from the inside of Herme-
neutics, challenging some of its methodological premises and not only its 
humanistic ideology. 
Recently, Hans U. Gumbrecht’s account of the movement of the Conceptual 
History (Gumbrecht: 2006, 7-36) gives a picture of the today’s challenges defying 
the supremacy of the hermeneutical methods in the History of Concepts, from 
the point of view of an insider. 
On the other hand, a growing feeling of an erosion of the belief in the 
proximity of Man to the historical situations in first order descriptions is no 
longer disputable and in itself a matter of cultural blames or incentive for 
«Second-Order Science». 
Concerning the meaning of the History of Philosophy to Philosophy, 
many methodological problems devised in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy seem today unsolved, only elliptically tackled or simply erased. 
Contemporary philosophers feel that Hegel’s History of Philosophy is indebted 
to his Philosophy of History and that this one is obsolete. 
Take for example the paradox of the freedom of the intelligible Spirit imma-
nent in History. In short, what Hegel intended with this idea was to show that 
if History of Philosophy has to have a philosophical importance, then History 
itself should have a rational substructure coextensive with the development of 
freedom. The circle of History and the self-consciousness of History begins in 
the modern times with freedom’s self-reflection. 
This claim is the responsible for the systematic connection between Phi-
losophy of History and History of Philosophy. The acceptance of the Hegelian 
definition of the subject matter of the History of Philosophy entails the refusal 
of the investigation of the philosophical past circumscribed by the historian 
or the philologist, whose objects are the grammatical meaning of texts or the 
historical facts scrutinized according to causal-temporal objective criteria. 
Hegel would also refuse the use of ancient philosophies for the purpose of 
illustration or justification of contemporary ideas or the meta-theoretical use 
of the notion of a dialogue between thinkers in a spiritual medium without a 
concrete historical ground.
The assumption of the thesis of the development of freedom in History is 
the complete idea of the History of Philosophy. This conjecture demands the 
proofs of the Philosophy of History.  
The systematic position of the History of Philosophy in Hegel’s Philosophy, 
especially its relation to the Science of Logic, imposes the examination of the 
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logical rhythm of the manifestation of the Idea in the History of Philosophy as 
the progression of the free thought towards self-consciousness. 
The development of a parallelism between the logical, the historical and 
Philosophy in its History is a conceptual challenge, especially because the 
logical and the historical should not be used as two abstract dimensions that 
an external observer can examine in comparisons but a self-referential circle.
Hegel’s systematic articulation of Logic with History of Philosophy and 
this one with Philosophy of History is a proposal to tackle the old troubles or 
paradoxes concerning what is permanent and what changes in the History of 
Thought which has motivated the varieties of the so-called philosophia perennis 
in a recent past.
The philosopher’s concept of «begriffene Geschichte» (Phenomenology 
of Spirit) defines the intelligibility of the historical time (also reflected in the 
History of Philosophy) at the level of the understanding of History, but not 
directly at the level of the causal-temporal nexuses between the events.   
I’ll address the paradoxes across three basic aspects (A., B., and C.): the 
pragmatic, the paradox of the beginning and the logical-semantic dimension.
A. Friedrich Nietzsche’s comments on the German representatives of 
the historicism and the German disease of History in his Unzeitgemässe Be-
trachtungen II (1874) are illustrations of the ambivalent sentiment regarding 
History and the philological methods applied to Philosophy at the turn of the 
century. F. Nietzsche’s key interrogation about the justification of the use of 
History of Philosophy to Philosophy is a result of the self-image of XIX centu-
ry historiography as a positive science that deals with details about facts and 
events, as shown in the type of the antiquarian History. Here, what makes the 
intelligibility of the historical are the causal-temporal connections. Causality 
is the only rule for the accumulation of knowledge on historical facts and for 
their intelligibility. 
One may feel that F. Nietzsche’s efforts to separate the useful and the incon-
venient for Life across the three types of History (the antiquarian, the critical 
and the monumental) are somehow vague if we apply them to the contempo-
rary situation of the historical research. But his pragmatic claim concerning 
the value of actuality for the fixation of the meaning of Thought against the 
goal of the accumulation of data in antiquarian History, remains central in the 
understanding of the philosophical interest of the History of Philosophy. Let 
us call it the commitment towards actuality. 
The Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II pointed to a paradoxical limit of 
the historical investigation of the past which consists in the persistence of the 
past in actual meaning effects and the resistance of the present to be part of 
the historical facts. Both aspects can be seen as attestations of the difference 
105On the Historicity of the History of Philosophy
Studia Hegeliana vol. IV (2018)
between life and truth or, according to another formulation, the distinction 
in value between life and intelligibility. However, F. Nietzsche’s commitment 
towards actuality does not mean the same as Descartes’ absolute beginning 
with the Cogito.
The difference of life and facts and the resulting paradoxes were also rel-
evant for Hegel and even if his solution was not in favour of a radical pragma-
tism, the presence of a tension between actuality and the past proves that his 
conception of the History of Philosophy cannot be confused with historicism or 
accumulation of factual data. A dialectic commitment towards actuality means 
the consideration of life as entailing an inner drive towards self-consciousness 
and self-understanding which is freedom, not a blind force. 
B. The Cartesian Cogito is a symbol of the absolute beginning in modern 
Philosophy, the freedom needed for the fixation of a point of departure of a 
quasi-deduction of a set of consistent and justified propositions. The Cartesian 
system interrupts the tradition. 
Obeying to the ambition of consistent justification, each system, like Des-
cartes’, is a model that transcends its epoch. Apparently, systematic consistency, 
a method of internal proof and the set of justified propositions are matters that 
can be reassessed detachedly from any historical consideration, as a construc-
tion of quasi-eternal truths. 
From a Hegelian viewpoint this is a highly disputable claim because with 
Descartes the criteria of the absolute beginning with the ego cogito and the ideal 
of the mathematical consistency of the system are both seen as unexplained 
effects of a will to begin with certainty that have no support in a historical 
self-understanding of modern Philosophy. The modern as an epoch, however, 
emerges in History precisely as the discovery journey of the self-causation of 
the self as self-consciousness of a human subject. Thus, the quasi-eternal truths 
attached to the beginning with the ego cogito result from historical demands 
of the modern foundation of the philosophical certainty. 
C. The attempts to formulate a consistent answer to the paradoxes com-
prising time and intelligibility evolved from the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
the Science of Logic to the Berlin Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The 
method of a direct assembling of the logical Idea and the historical time was 
excluded. The synchronicity between the logical and the real-historical is itself 
a philosophical puzzle, similar to the relation between the logical and the real 
(«Real Philosophies») in the system of the Encyclopaedia. Synchronicity, the 
meaning of the now, the present, is at least twofold, if one reads its meaning 
from the logical perspective or from the historical concrete evolution. If the 
historical identified as causal connection between events in chronological time 
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is essentially open, not concluded, the logical understanding of the historical 
is conceived in a logical now. 
History of Philosophy introduces in this twofold explanation a third 
assessment, a mediation. A self-conscious manifestation of the historical de-
velopment takes its own place, in philosophies, systems, in a variety of textual 
philosophical production, and in concepts specified with semantical-historical 
and logical-semantic properties. 
In History of Philosophy, conceptual semantics is embedded in logical 
categories and in the socio-historical development of the linguistic meanings. 
Nonetheless, conceptual semantics cannot synchronize, in an exact manner, 
its logical and historical faces. Semantics reveals the structure of a stage in the 
self-reflection of the logical Idea, but not the coincidence of the Idea with the 
historical reality. This explains why a concept entails semantics and does not 
denote directly the reality.
Hegel’s solutions for the paradoxes (A., B, and C.) are not simple and 
unquestionably they are not reliant on a choice between the poles of the tra-
ditional alternative subject-object, such as realism or idealism, historical facts 
or logical explanations. 
The use of the pre-Kantian and Kantian relation of the subject-object poles 
of the cognitive relation in the explanation of Hegel’s appraisal of History of 
Philosophy is misleading. 
The basic arguments Martial Gueroult mobilized to criticize Hegel’s views 
in the theoretical part of his Dianoématique entail the assumption of the non-re-
flective structure of History and the opposition between facts (phenomena) 
and logic (dialectical reason) that the German philosopher contested in the 
pre-Kantian and in Kantian Epistemology.  
Along the French reception, aspects of Hegel’s critical appraisal of the old 
paradoxes were re-examined by Victor Delbos (1917), Émile Bréhier (1928), 
Paul Ricoeur (1955) or M. Gueroult (1979) with objections to Hegel’s solutions. 
Along many decades the philosophers commonly included in «Analytic 
Philosophy» overlooked Hegel’s critical assessment to the paradoxes, probably 
because they were not focused on the historical and philological investigation 
of the past. 
Recent transformations of the historical self-consciousness of the analyt-
ic philosophers changed their attitude (see: Westphal 2010/11), even if some 
affiliated authors (Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom or John 
McDowell) alternate between descriptions of the systems’ coherence and a 
pragmatic perspective that favours the study of the historical arguments of 
philosophers in order to better establish contemporary thesis, according to a 
non-historical method. 
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This last alternative does not embrace Hegel’s singular, post-Kantian and 
non-dualistic, approach to the historical and logical (dialectical) dimensions 
of the History of Philosophy.
On the other hand, Historiography was never sympathetic to the subordi-
nation of the variability and contingency of the historical events to the prose of 
the Absolute. Respectful to the historians’ warnings, some academics devoted 
to the History of Philosophy have circumscribed their work to philological 
tasks of textual deciphering, periodization and monographic interpretation, 
which in the German context influenced by W. Dilthey shaped a method ap-
plied by Hermann Nohl and his successors to Hegel’s work, under the heading 
Entstehungssgeschichte. 
Contemporary History of Philosophy continues to regard its tasks in a 
similar vein. Presentations of academic results in History of Philosophy, con-
gresses, academic thesis, particularly in European countries, are predominately 
configured according to philological demands.
Applying the hermeneutical notion of dialogue to History of Philosophy, 
P. Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1955) envisaged in the singular essence of each Philosophy 
in historical discussion with other singular essences, a motive for the refusal of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History in connection to History of Philosophy and the 
totalization of the historical world of the Philosophy of History. 
P. Ricoeur’s historical dialogue between philosophies occurs as a com-
municative praxis that cannot eliminate as untrue one of the participants. It 
is the meaning of the communicative efforts of the philosophies that realizes 
a structure of the true knowledge, surpassing the limits of the sceptic views on 
the incommensurable aspirations to truth. 
Nonetheless, the hermeneutical, communicative model of the dialogue is 
not able to erase the central figure of the real in Hegel. 
It is the general problem of the concretization of the free Spirit in History 
(Reason in History) that explains two queries considered in Hegel’s Lectures 
on the History of Philosophy. 
The first, already referred as Hegel’s repetition of the old paradox of the 
History of Philosophy, asks how it is possible that the Thought which, appar-
ently, is not submitted to time, can have a History. 
The second is a less radical query. It takes for scrutiny the connections of 
the History of Philosophy to the other histories (histories of Religion, Politics, 
Law, the Arts or Science) in the formation of the «concrete totalities».   
In my view, it is the understanding of the ties of the History of Philoso-
phy to the other histories that can give a contemporary look to the ideal of a 
reconstruction of the actuality of the Real (Zustand der Welt) as a «concrete 
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totality» (konkrete Totalität) of figures of meaning with historical and logical 
connotations. 
II. Figures
The historical character of Philosophy is a mediation of the active move-
ment of the Universal and the particular form of its temporal expression. The 
historical is not opposed to the logical. The concrete expression of the universal 
represents its particularity. However, the particular is not an unrelated form. 
A particularity relates to other particularities. This relational structure of the 
particular is emphasized along the text of the Kolleg 1825/26 of the Lectures 
on the History of Philosophy. Here, the notion of Gestalt (figure) gives the con-
crete expression of the mediation. Hegel uses Gestalt according to a conceptual 
pattern acquired in Jena and modified in the Science of Logic to accommodate 
the manifestation process of the logical Idea. 
Figure is a dynamic constellation of relations between components pro-
vided with a logical meaning in the Idea’s exteriorisation. 
After the Science of Logic, the Introduction to the Grundlinien der Philoso-
phie des Rechts (§ 32) gives a reason for the characterisation of such components 
as concepts and real existences of the Idea. 
In parallel, the Kolleg 1825/26 on History of Philosophy revises again the 
figure and conceives its essential features according to the historical approach – 
wir haben uns also geschichtlich zu verhalten (Hegel: 1993(b), 221). Historically, 
the figures are temporal, particular, expressions of the Universal. 
Their predicates of multiplicity, contingency and episodic manifestations 
are described in the notion of a sequential series (Reihenfolge) of figures in 
both collections of Lectures. Thus, the figures are put in an order that can be 
followed in a temporal orientation. 
In the History of Philosophy, the logical figure gives to itself a contingent 
expression which Hegel calls Erscheinung, also agreeing to his former concep-
tual practise. 
In the context, the manifestation (Erscheinung) has a double meaning. 
Regarding the logical Idea, the development of its determinations as 
knowledge of itself gives to the Idea a manifestation similar to the objectivity 
of knowledge. Furthermore (die zweite Erscheinung), the productions of the 
knowing Idea concern circumstances, temporal and geographical, and can 
materialize in individualities. 
According to both directions of the logical manifestation, the complete 
circle of the development of the knowing Idea is continuously historical. His-
toricity is not an accident added to this spiritual movement, but a structural 
dimension of the self-determination as manifestation in a series. The main 
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consequence is the already mentioned thesis of a logical rhythm that can be 
recalled from the historical data. 
The guiding thesis of the Philosophy of History that is conserved in the 
perspectives about the History of Philosophy is the idea of History as realiza-
tion of freedom. 
The singularity of the historical epochs, of the individualities and philo-
sophical systems is acknowledged. 
The comments on the antique character of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and 
other Greek philosophers led to the conclusion that each Philosophy is the 
reflective product of its time. Its singularity relies on the individuality of the 
philosophers that realize different possibilities given in the semantic matrix 
of a defined epoch validating, at a certain extent, a prosopography (Hegel: 
1993(b), 226). 
Reason in History reverberates as «Philosophy of its own time». It rep-
resents the orientation of the logical figures to their historical belongings and 
the intelligibility of this process in the philosophical prose. 
Hegel calls this manifestation in figures «meaning» (Bedeutung): Aber der 
Gedanke hat auch eine Erscheinung, und diese von ihm unterscheidend, kann 
man wohl von «Bedeutung» sprechen (Hegel: 1993(b), 222). 
Therefore, the relation of the logical Idea to its historical figures is con-
ceivable as a process of meaning rendering and incarnation of a dynamic that 
has its source in freedom. 
In a contemporary assessment, one may say that if a figure is the logical 
structure of meaning rendering in History to History, the figure’s meaning 
emerges in terms, concepts and in semantical associations as the concrete com-
ponents responsible for the historical meanings of the figurative manifestation. 
A contemporary rewriting of Hegel’s intentions may rediscover the notion 
of figure by inscribing it in the semantic evolution of terminological constella-
tions, relying on the society’s structure and on the historical evolution. 
In Hegel’s scheme interweaving logical Idea and figure, the epochal se-
mantical matrixes would operate at a mediating level, in-between the logical 
universality and the historical particularities. 
A semantical investigation at the level of the rendering of historical 
meanings in terminology is valid even if one withdraws Hegel’s logical and 
metaphysical explanations from his scheme.     
The interpretative conversion of the Hegelian theory of the logical figurative 
manifestation into an historical description of meaning rendering to History is 
a viable approach, leading to large semantical researches, complementing the 
limited vocabulary of the conventional History of Philosophy. 
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Figure and figurative understanding of History can now tolerate a cor-
rection - the figure’s meaning may represent the tissue of particular semantic 
articulations in historical terminological evolving grids.
III. Langsamkeit des Weltgeistes
In Hegel’s manuscripts composed for the 1820 and 1823 editions of the 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the philosopher discusses what seems to 
be a not very frequent notion in his vocabulary – «Langsamkeit», «Langsamkeit 
des Weltgeistes» (Hegel: 1993(b), 35-37). 
The slowness of the Spirit concerns the gradual process of the History of 
Thought entering in its own free space as the spiritual substance in the time of 
the world. It also represents the slowness of the Spirit gathering together the 
dimensions of its «concrete nature», the diversity of its real relations. 
Ms. 1820 calls this relational diversity Umfang (Hegel: 1993(b), 37). 
The philosopher characterizes further the formation of the relational di-
versity of the Spirit as a particular activity. It is this activity of the Spirit that 
consumes time and is slow. 
The final deed is a Gestalt, a figure. 
After the introduction of the act of the configuration of the relations (ge-
stalten), the same passage concludes with the notion of a concrete totality: das 
Gestalten seines Begriffs, sein Denken seiner, ist zugleich Gestaltung seines ganzen 
Umfangs, seiner konkreten Totalität in der Geschichte (Hegel: 1993(b), idem). 
The logic articulation of the text is clear about the thesis of the configura-
tion of the relations as the activity responsible for the real extent (Umfang) of 
the knowing Spirit. Consequently, the concrete totality can only be disclosed 
through the figure (Gestalt). It is not an abstract construction and it takes its 
own time to be articulated.   
The totality is not a given reality, but a production of relations of meaning. 
The process of the Spirit’s self-appropriation, as free movement, configures its 
relational diversity as a meaningful progression. 
If the notion of Tradition, from tradere, to confide, surrender, deliver, 
transmit, gives a partial sense to a line of transmission, the concept of Epoch, 
from époché, suspension, interruption, modules the tradition in figures that 
do not follow linearly ones from the others. Thus, History is not repetition of 
the same.  
Meaning applies to figures as the organisation of relations between concrete 
elements in defined epochs. The concrete depth of a figure is specified in the 
aspects of the Ethical Life of a People. The dimensions of the self-organization 
of the Ethical Life also defines the different branches of the historical knowl-
111On the Historicity of the History of Philosophy
Studia Hegeliana vol. IV (2018)
edge (politics, science, arts, religion, and philosophy) as fields of meaning 
formation identified as particular structures of the logical Idea in its epochal 
manifestations.     
Allowing here a practical interpretation, with totality or concrete totality 
one may refer to the coherence of semantic structures shaped in the distinct 
historical disciplines of the meaning formation. The fact that these structures 
are evoked whenever the understanding of a real process takes place, proves that 
one envisages real figures (Gestalten) and not arbitrary fictions. The conception 
of such network of figures is the thought of a totality or concrete totality if the 
goal with the conception is not a reduction of some parts to other parts or the 
consideration of fragments. 
Regarding the History of Philosophy totality or totalization do not mean 
Summa in the medieval sense, but the thinking presence of real relations pro-
duced in the process of the self-understanding of the logical Idea.
The absence of synchrony, the reference to a slowness of the historical 
emergence of the meaning of History itself explains the «patience of the Con-
cept» in front of the openness of the historical particularities and the need for 
a consideration of the richness of the particular besides the universal.
Slowness is also the index of a structural non-coincidence between the 
discovery of freedom in the History of Philosophy and in the special histories.
IV. Concrete Totalities and the tasks of Evolutionary Semantics
In Ms. 1820 along the division about the «concept of Philosophy», Hegel 
claims that the History of Philosophy is not concerned with the particular events 
or the particularities of the peoples’ existence, but with the «general character 
of the People and Epoch» (Hegel: 1993(b), 57). The element of the universality 
represents the domain of development of the History of Philosophy. However, 
this is already a universality shaped by its historical materials.
The understanding of the meaning dimensions of the Ethical Life of a 
People in the historical disciplines deals with semantical premises connected 
to cultural memory and to the use of a shared semantic memory. According 
to this view, theoretical uses of the items of the semantic memory converts 
general shared symbols embedded in linguistic forms in concepts, in scientific 
or philosophical concepts. 
If the History of Philosophy has to have a genuine historical orientation, 
then the conversion of semantic memory in conceptual traditions and the 
combined evolution of both are central topics. The attention to these evolu-
tionary processes prevents History of Philosophy to identify itself with a study 
of authorities and influences, monographies about philosophers, doxography, 
or naïve pragmatic appropriations of the past. 
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If the articulation of the History of Philosophy with the other histories 
and the semantic-conceptual evolution are seen as features of an integrated 
model, they are also the best defence against the objection of an «external» 
perspective on the History of Philosophy or against the infamous theory of 
the reflex (Ricoeur: 1955, 49). In semantic and conceptual evolution nothing 
can be considered external in opposition to an internal. 
What was vague in P. Ricoeur’s 1955 dialogical model of the History of 
Philosophy was balanced by the «concept of concept» in R. Koselleck’s History 
of Concepts. The collective attempt to examine the «fundamental socio-histor-
ical concepts» of the modern world under «History of Concepts» entails also 
a serious methodological proposal to address Hegel’s relation of the logical 
figures to the concrete totalities.
After the publication in the 1970s-1990s of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 
in the macro-theoretical Part I of Begriffsgeschichten (2006) the last version of 
R. Koselleck’s views on the origins, meaning, main goals and confrontations 
lines of the History of Concepts is disclosed. 
Concerning the confrontations, the author clarified the implications of 
the self-limitation of the History of Concepts to the literary, philosophical or 
scientific articulated language of concepts vis-à-vis the uses of language in daily 
life or in the discursive conceptualizing of non-canonical literary production. 
If R. Koselleck didn’t subscribe the elimination from the research of these 
forms of discursive conceptualizing, he defended himself against an abusive 
proliferation of fields of study dealing with non-reflective uses of the concepts. 
The printed form of the modern literary and philosophical communica-
tion, under defined social conditions, makes possible the quick diffusion of 
concepts. Follows from this situation a multiplicity of semantic associations 
that are not constrained under any conceptual discipline. The admission of 
the semantic openness of the conceptual meanings to ordinary language and 
discursive conceptualizing due to the modern form of the textual communi-
cation seems to defy the traditional importance, reinforced by Hegel, of the 
History of Philosophy as a central reflective domain for the self-reflection of 
the historical concepts. 
Indeed, communication is a reflective process but does not obey to the 
philosophical use of reflection. 
The problematic confrontations of the History of Concepts don’t finish here. 
Another problem to be handled is the need for categorization of the seman-
tic resonances of the differentiation of Society in linguistic conceptual indices. 
This full programme was not envisaged in the many faces of the History of 
Concepts.
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As already stated, both confrontation lines in R. Koselleck’s History of 
Concepts were inherent to Hegel’s problems with the relation of the figures 
to the concrete historical totalities. They were also reshaped in N. Luhmann’s 
own definition of the role of Semantics in his theory of social differentiation. 
The solutions are different, the confrontation lines may have different 
categorizations, but the tensioned fields remain.
Explained by sociological tools, the semantic legacy of concepts is not 
exclusively ruled by the transmission lines of the History of Philosophy. It is 
related to the evolutionary structure of the society and to the forms of com-
munication, especially to scientific, literary and scholar communication with 
their social and symbolic forms, semantic networks and material constituents. 
Semantic matrixes of defined terminological groups vary with the degree 
of conceptual elasticity or openness to semantic variation. Nonetheless, the 
figurative (logical) character of the historical terminology doesn’t cause that 
with a term or concept one faces the concrete reality. Semantic evolution gives 
indices of the self-descriptions of the Ethical Life of a People, but not the Truth. 
This explains the internal duality of the notion of conceptual semantics – 
conceptual and semiotic.   
Philosophy reframes the historical semantics according to its own con-
ceptual repertoire, eventually structured in systems. A linear linkage from 
the philosophical repertoire to the general semantic possibilities of an epoch 
is impossible, not only due to the semantic variation that characterizes the 
evolution of modern communication.  
Each new Philosophy combines in its own way the semantic and conceptual 
possibilities of a defined epoch and the heritage of conceptual genealogies of 
longer duration. One can grasp this rule in the evolution of social and political 
categories. 
Short and long durations are assembled. Philosophies that are self-con-
scious about their past need to be committed to a continuous critical scrutiny 
regarding the entanglements of their semantical streams with social evolution 
and larger semantical connections. 
Conceived as contemporary transformations of the Hegelian concepts of 
figure and concrete totality, several analytical tasks can be sketched along the 
semantic-conceptual field. 
A first group of tasks, already mentioned, refers to the identification and 
explanation of transfers from the general semantic social memories to concep-
tual formations along short and long durations within generative bidirectional 
channels. 
A second group needs to address the formation of clusters of very specific 
conceptual lineages associated to semantic networks.
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A third group concerns the identification of levels of philosophical com-
munication that entails essentially concepts and conceptual premises with 
the correspondent technicalities of a specialized field, eventually organized in 
systems of concepts.
A last set of tasks should address the importance of the scholar communi-
cation of Philosophy through the History of Philosophy and the contribution 
of the Academia to the crystallization of specified conceptual groups. 
Along the short and long semantic durations, the History of Philosophy is a 
testimony of the diversity of the epochs echoing in terminological arrangements, 
negotiations and adaptations, especially if it is the actuality and the intelligence 
of the present that shape the line of the semantic horizon.
V. Special Histories and History of Philosophy
Eduard Gans was a pioneer in the application to the special Histories of the 
Hegelian concept of History, beginning also a comparative and interdisciplin-
ary approach to History which had in the concept of World a pivotal notion. 
His contributions to a «Universal History of Law» (Gans: 1971, 13-36; Gans: 
1981) are commonly mentioned as polemic documents portraying the debates 
between the «Historical School», historicism and Hegelianism. 
E. Gans inferred from Hegel’s views on World’s History a justification for 
the development in the field of the Comparative History of Law of the self-con-
sciousness of freedom as a criterion for the discrimination between epochal 
normative systems which was not envisaged in the cumulative research of the 
Historical School. 
If one admits historical criteria of the formation of normative systems and 
if the norms should obey to these criteria, the evolution of Law is not a linear 
path, but obeys to a reflective modulation of tradition and epochs.
E. Gans’s ideas were Hegel’s theses along his Lectures on Philosophy of 
Law and Philosophy of History.
From Hegels’ Kolleg 1825/26 on History of Philosophy it is possible to 
infer a coherent theory on the unity of Spirit and the diversity of its historical 
manifestations not only in different epochs but in the same epoch in different 
expressions, such as the «Constitution of the States, Religion, or Art». 
Here, Hegel shows that the conventional idea of an «influence» between 
these fields and Philosophy is mistaken. «Influence» points to a causal associ-
ation of previously existing separated phenomena. The notion of an internal 
relation of the Spirit and its manifestations is a way to avoid such abstraction. 
In the Lectures on the Aesthetics Hegel applied his historical approach to 
the Arts, as a parallel to a similar procedure regarding Religion. Again, the 
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division C. of the chapter III (Der Staat) of the part III (Die Sittlichkeit) of the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Law is devoted to «World History».
The articulation of the Universal History and the special Histories defines 
the concrete substance of the structure of an epoch. Philosophy is one side of 
the Spirit sharing its epochal self-determination with the other spiritual forms 
– Law, Religion, and Art. 
Through the History of Philosophy, the explanation of an epoch’s meaning 
in particular philosophical systems identifies the being of an epoch to another 
epoch, creates meaning that is effective in time. 
The translation in thought of the epochal meanings causes adjournment 
and many resonances across the special histories. This is especially important 
for a scrutiny of the historical resonances of the philosophical meaning of the 
modern but is not exclusive of this epoch.
In the Kolleg 1825/26, the relation of Christianity to Greek Philosophy is 
characterized by the capture of the objective form of a former thinking process 
about former epochs and its adjournment alongside the slower duration of 
the Spirit of Time, echoing in the religious consciousness, among other fields. 
Regarding the Greeks and Christianity Hegel says: das, was die griechische 
Philosophie gewesen ist, in die christlichen Welt in die Wirklichkeit getreten ist 
(Hegel: 1993(b), 238).    
The philosopher’s well-known thesis about the dawn of Minerva supple-
ments the thesis on the adjournment. 
Philosophy arrives later to a world that entered already in a crepuscular 
stage. 
The active productivity of the thinking process, as judgement, contains a 
negative power. By producing its object, it also introduces a vacillation in the 
Spirit of Time (Hegel: 1993(b), 239). 
The vacillation of the Spirit (wanken machen) that follows the reflection 
represents the contrasting effects of Philosophy as Weltweisheit – a division 
factor and reconciliation maker in the Spirit of Time. 
The achievement of the meaning of History in the modern discovery of 
the consciousness of freedom represents to the concrete historical epochs and 
figures a continual wanken machen of what is taken for granted, as the continual 
adjournment of freedom in History. 
116 EDMUNDO BALSEMÃO PIRES
Studia Hegeliana vol. IV  (2018)
References
Alvaréz-Goméz, Mariano. 1984. «Idea y Acción. La Historia como Teodicea 
en Hegel«. In Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia 11 (1984) pp. 205-230.
Idem. 2009. «El Hombre como Medio y Fin en la Historia». In Idem & Paredes 
Martín, Mª del Carmen (coord.) La Filosofia de la Historia a partir de 
Hegel. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca pp. 13-32.
Bréhier, Émile. 1928. Histoire de la Philosophie I. L‘ Antiquité et le Moyen 
Âge. Paris: Félix Alcan.
Delbos, Victor. «De La Méthode en Histoire de la Philosophie». In Revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale, 24, 4 (1917), pp. 369-382.
Gans, Eduard. 1971. Philosophische Schriften. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Idem. 1981. Naturrecht und Universalrechtsgeschichte. Nachschrift I. Hegel. 
Stuttgart: Klett-Cota.
Gueroult, Martial. 1979. Dianoématique III. Philosophie de L‘ Histoire de 
la Philosophie. Paris: Aubier.
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich. 2006. Dimensionen und Grenzen der 
Begriffsgeschichte. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink.
Hegel, G. W. Friedrich. 1986. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. Werke vols. 
13-15. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
Idem. 1993(a). Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Einleitung. 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Idem. 1993(b). Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Einleitung. 
Orientalische Philosophie. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Idem. 1994. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte I. Die 
Vernunft in der Geschichte. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Koselleck, Reinhart. 2006. Begriffsgeschichten. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
Luhmann, Niklas. 1993-1995. Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik I-IV. 
Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
Nietzsche, Friedrich.  «Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen I-IV» in Idem. 
Sämtliche Werke 1. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1955. Histoire et Vérité. Paris: Seuil.
117On the Historicity of the History of Philosophy
Studia Hegeliana vol. IV (2018)
Westphal, Kenneth. «Analytic Philosophy and the Long Tail of Scientia» 
In The Owl of Minerva 42, 1/2 (2010-11) pp. 1-18.

